Tragedy Averted: The Promise of Collaboration

Environmentalists, for the most part, continue their skepticism of collaborative approaches to environmental and natural resource decision making, particularly on public lands. Such approaches, many have argued, are an abdication of government authority, circumvent environmental laws, lead to lowest common denominator solutions, are not accountable to public and scientific review processes, and are undemocratic. Environmentalists can point to flawed decision-making processes that contain these elements. Such processes, however, are generally not publicly and statutorily accountable collaborative processes. Moreover, thoughtful and accountable collaborative approaches, more than other kinds of decision-making processes, hold promise that other decision-making approaches lack—that of creating a sense of shared ownership of our larger and more complex problems. Achieving shared ownership, and ultimately averting the inevitable tragedies of the commons facing society today, requires a shift in how decision-making processes are structured and managed. This article explores paradoxical barriers to creating a culture of shared ownership and the role of collaboration in overcoming those barriers.

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