论文信息 - Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games - 字舞流文

Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games

We investigate the equivalence between several notions of bargaining sets which occur in the literature and the core of simple games.

David Wettstein | Ezra Einy | E. Einy | David Wettstein

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