Coherence, Hypothetical Cases, and Precedent

Coherence accounts of practical reasoning in general, of which legal reasoning is a particular case, postulate the existence of a theory, sought in deliberation, which best displays as coherent the relationships among specific reasons for action which conflict in application to the case to be decided. These relationships are discovered in part by consideration of the way in which the same conflicting reasons apply in other cases, the resolution of which is settled. Ronald Dworkin's account of legal reasoning in Law's Empire is an example of a coherence account. Coherence accounts provide elements of various familiar conceptions of practical reasoning, such as the Rawlsian conception of reflective equilibrium as the outcome of a process of mutual adjustment between theory and intuition, and the decisiontheoretic conception of rationality in terms of adjustment between data about preferences, criteria of choice, and principles of consistency.' I have elsewhere discussed the general rationale and motivation for coherence accounts of practical reasoning, illustrated the process of seeking coherence through deliberation with both legal and ethical examples, abstractly characterized the search for coherence, and considered various problems to which the abstract characterization gives rise.2 In this paper I shall: First, briefly set out my abstract characterization of deliberation as a search for coherence; Second, consider various further examples of legal and ethical reasoning and indicate briefly the way in which they provide instances of my general coherentist characterization of deliberation; Third, point out the generally similar roles within coherentist accounts of practical reasoning of settled actual cases and settled hypothetical cases as data to be accounted for by the sought-after theory or principles; Fourth, present an objection to coherence accounts of legal reasoning in particular discussed by Kenneth Kress, who argues that they may give rise to