Agreeing on social outcomes using individual CP-nets

This work applies the CP-net preference representation to the problem of negotiating optimal joint outcomes, hoping to exploit the CP-net benefit of efficient preferential optimization in multiagent settings. A fundamental challenge in doing so is that acyclic CP-nets only capture an agent's preferences over outcomes qualitatively, as a partial order, making comparisons between agents' strengths of preferences over outcomes problematic. This article presents a plausible (though not the only) strategy to assess outcomes based on their relative positions in the agents' partial orders. Given the ability to compare strength of preference over outcomes, a brute-force search in the space of outcomes can provably yield an optimal (maximin) joint outcome. More importantly, it is shown that the optimal joint outcome can, in principle, be found more efficiently by using a multiagent variation of the CP-net preferential optimization algorithm, provided that the right decisions are made about which agent assigns each variable. Finally, heuristics are developed that find an approximately optimal variable assignment strategy. Empirical evaluation indicates that, relative to the outcome graph search, the new heuristic algorithm based on direct variable assignment achieves exponential speedup, while costing only a small constant factor in solution quality.

[1]  Toby Walsh,et al.  Aggregating Partially Ordered Preferences , 2009, J. Log. Comput..

[2]  H. Simon,et al.  A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice , 1955 .

[3]  Ronen I. Brafman,et al.  UCP-Networks: A Directed Graphical Representation of Conditional Utilities , 2001, UAI.

[4]  Ronen I. Brafman,et al.  CP-nets: Reasoning and Consistency Testing , 2002, KR.

[5]  Martha E. Pollack,et al.  Autominder: an intelligent cognitive orthotic system for people with memory impairment , 2003, Robotics Auton. Syst..

[6]  Nic Wilson,et al.  Extending CP-Nets with Stronger Conditional Preference Statements , 2004, AAAI.

[7]  J. Kelly Social Choice Theory: An Introduction , 1988 .

[8]  Ronen I. Brafman,et al.  Preference‐Based Constrained Optimization with CP‐Nets , 2004, Comput. Intell..

[9]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders , 2008, AAAI.

[10]  Edmund H. Durfee,et al.  Making social choices from individuals' CP-nets , 2007, AAMAS '07.

[11]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  Distributed constraint satisfaction for formalizing distributed problem solving , 1992, [1992] Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems.

[12]  K. Arrow Social Choice and Individual Values , 1951 .

[13]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Voting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies , 2008, AAAI.

[14]  Ronen I. Brafman,et al.  CP-nets: A Tool for Representing and Reasoning withConditional Ceteris Paribus Preference Statements , 2011, J. Artif. Intell. Res..

[15]  Ronen I. Brafman,et al.  Introducing Variable Importance Tradeoffs into CP-Nets , 2002, UAI.

[16]  Luke Hunsberger,et al.  Algorithms for a temporal decoupling problem in multi-agent planning , 2002, AAAI/IAAI.

[17]  Toby Walsh,et al.  Incompleteness and Incomparability in Preference Aggregation , 2007, IJCAI.

[18]  Ronen I. Brafman,et al.  On the Foundations of Qualitative Decision Theory , 1996, AAAI/IAAI, Vol. 2.

[19]  Toby Walsh,et al.  mCP Nets: Representing and Reasoning with Preferences of Multiple Agents , 2004, AAAI.