Cyber-Physical Attack-Oriented Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Modeling, Analysis and Experiment Environment

The most essential difference between information technology (IT) and industrial control systems (ICS) is that ICSs are Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) and they have direct effects on the physical world. In the context of this paper, the specific attacks which can lead to physical damage via cyber means are named as Cyber-Physical Attacks. In the real world, malware associated events, such as Stuxnet, have proven that this kind of attack is both feasible and destructive. We proposed an ICS-CPS operation dual-loop analysis model (ICONDAM) for analyzing ICS' human-cyber-physical interdependences. And we present an architecture and the features of our CPS-based Critical Infrastructure Integrated Experiment Platform (C2I2EP) ICS experiment environment. Through both theory analysis and experiments over the Cyber-Physical Attacks performed on our ICS experiment environment, we can say that ICONDAM model and C2I2EP experiment environment has a promising prospect in the field of ICS cyber-security research.

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