A Logic for the Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols

Abstract : A logic designed to analyze cryptographic protocols is presented in this report. The logic has distinct means for representing propositional knowledge in the sense of familiarity with an individual, e.g., a particular key. It is argued that the introduction of a knowledge predicate is useful and genuine increase in expressive power. The semantics and metalogic of the logic are also explored.

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