Logic, Language, and Calculus

The difference between object-language and metalanguage is crucial for logical analysis, but has yet not been examined for the field of computer science. In this paper the difference is examined with regard to inferential relations. It is argued that inferential relations in a metalanguage (like a calculus for propositional logic) cannot represent conceptual relations of natural language. Inferential relations govern our concept use and understanding. Several approaches in the field of Natural Language Understanding (NLU) and Natural Language Inference (NLI) take this insight in account, but do not consider, how an inference can be assessed as a good inference. I present a logical analysis that can assesss the normative dimension of inferences, which is a crucial part of logical understanding and goes beyond formal understanding of metalanguages.

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