论文信息 - The τ-value, The core and semiconvex games

The τ-value, The core and semiconvex games

Theτ-value for cooperativen-person games is central in this paper. Conditions are given which guarantee that theτ-value lies in the core of the game. A full-dimensional cone of semiconvex games is introduced. This cone contains the cones of convex and exact games and there is a simple formula for theτ-value for such games. The subclass of semiconvex games with constant gap function is characterized in several ways. It turns out to be an (n+1)-dimensional cone and for all games in this cone the Shapley value, the nucleolus and theτ-value coincide.

Stef Tijs | S. Tijs | T. Driessen | T. S. H. Driessen

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