Reproduction of Nomative Agents: A Simulation Study

The paper presents experiments of a simulation model of aggression control in populations of agents endowed with knowledge about others' reputation (compliant vs. cheaters). The reproduc tive advantages of different strategies of aggression control, i.e., normative (e.g., "do not attack a food-owner") vs. non-normative ("do not attack a stronger agent"), are compared under given cir cumstances (e.g., exchange of information about others' reputation). The objectives of the model are: (a) investigate the role of social agents' internal variables (repre sentations, rules, etc.) in the interaction between social processes and agents; while the direction from agents to social processes is usually a focus of attention in simulation models, the reverse one (from social processes to agents) is not; our findings seem to show that some normative disposi tion of agents is an "emergent" effect of social processes; (b) question the widely shared assump tion that agents are egoist and all which is good in society is either an emergent effect of social life or an institutional task. Our findings seem to show that there may be an adaptive advantage in acting pro-socially.

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