Confused yet Successful: - Theoretical Comparison of Distinguishers for Monobit Leakages in Terms of Confusion Coefficient and SNR

Many side-channel distinguishers (such as DPA/DoM, CPA, Euclidean Distance, KSA, MIA, etc.) have been devised and studied to extract keys from cryptographic devices. Each has pros and cons and find applications in various contexts. These distinguishers have been described theoretically in order to determine which distinguisher is best for a given context, enabling an unambiguous characterization in terms of success rate or number of traces required to extract the secret key.

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