Unsettling aspects of voting theory

Summary. Voting procedures are known to be plagued with a variety of difficulties such as strategic voting, or where a voter is rewarded with a better election outcome by not voting, or where a winning candidate can lose by receiving more support. Once we know that these problems can occur, the next objective should be to completely understand how, why, and where they arise. Namely, for each election procedure, the new goal is to determine when such problems can occur, all voter types who can cause these difficulties, and the actions they must take. This paper develops an easily used approach to handle all of these issues for standard voting methods. New intuitive explanations for these various oddities follow from this approach.

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