Error-Tolerant Side-Channel Cube Attack Revisited

Error-tolerant side-channel cube attacks have been recently introduced as an efficient cryptanalytic technique against block ciphers. The known Dinur-Shamir model and its extensions require error-free data for at least part of the measurements. Then, a new model was proposed at CHES 2013, which can recover the key in the scenario that each measurement contains noise. The key recovery problem is converted to a decoding problem under a binary symmetric channel. In this paper, we propose a high error-tolerant side-channel cube attack. The error-tolerant rate is significantly improved by utilizing the polynomial approximation and a new variant of cube attack. The simulation results on PRESENT show that given about \(2^{21.2}\) measurements, each with an error probability of \(40.5\,\%\), the new model achieves a success probability of \(50\,\%\) for the key recovery. The error-tolerant level can be enhanced further if the attacker can obtain more measurements.