Quantum Key Distribution Protocols

The goal of any quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is to generate a shared secret key between two distant parties over a public communication channel. The crucial point here is that the key generating protocol is provably secure against any possible attack that an eavesdropper can perform. It is the law of physics (or, in fact, quantum mechanics) that guarantees the security of the protocol, not only the technical limitations that exist in practical implementations. Therefore, one can be sure that the protocol will be secure until eternity, and not only until someone invents a crazily powerful decryption machine (or, to be precise, the protocol will be secure as long as quantum mechanics is not disproved). In general, a quantum key distribution protocol can be divided into two parts: The first part is the quantum transmission phase, in which Alice and Bob send and/or measure quantum states. The second part is the classical post-processing phase, where they turn the bit strings generated in the quantum phase into a pair of secure keys.

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