Extended cognition and epistemic luck

When extended cognition is extended into mainstream epistemology, an awkward tension arises when considering cases of environmental epistemic luck. Surprisingly, it is not at all clear how the mainstream verdict that agents lack knowledge in cases of environmental luck can be reconciled with principles central to extended cognition.

[1]  Wayne Riggs.  Luck, Knowledge, and Control , 2009 .

[2]  Duncan Pritchard,et al.  Anti-luck epistemology , 2007, Synthese.

[3]  Jonathan L. Kvanvig,et al.  The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding , 2003 .

[4]  S. Stich,et al.  EPISTEMIC INTUITIONS IN FAKE-BARN THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS , 2014, Episteme.

[5]  Christoph Kelp.  Knowledge: The Safe-Apt View , 2013, Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding.

[6]  Edmund L. Gettier.  Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? , 1963, Arguing About Knowledge.

[7]  J. Carter.  Anti-Luck Epistemology and Safety’s (Recent) Discontents , 2010 .

[8]  B. Madison.  Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology , 2011 .

[9]  S. Hetherington.  How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge , 2011 .

[10]  S. Hetherington.  The extended knower , 2012 .

[11]  Roderick M. Chisholm,et al.  Theory of Knowledge , 1989 .

[12]  Eleonora Cresto.  A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge , 2009 .

[13]  J. Carter.  Radical Skepticism, Closure, and Robust Knowledge , 2011 .

[14]  D. Pritchard.  A EPISTEMIC LUCK , 2003 .

[15]  Krist Vaesen.  Knowledge without credit, exhibit 4: extended cognition , 2010, Synthese.

[16]  A. Clark,et al.  The Extended Mind , 1998, Analysis.

[17]  Robert D. Rupert.  Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition , 2004 .

[18]  P. Kleingeld,et al.  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , 2013 .

[19]  B. Jarvis,et al.  Knowledge: Value on the Cheap , 2013 .

[20]  B. Jarvis.  Knowledge, Cognitive Achievement, and Environmental Luck , 2013 .

[21]  Andy Clark,et al.  Memento’s Revenge: The Extended Mind, Extended , 2004 .

[22]  Duncan Pritchard,et al.  Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck , 2018, The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology.

[23]  Christoph Kelp.  Knowledge, Understanding and Virtue , 2014 .

[24]  Martin Peterson,et al.  An Introduction to Decision Theory , 2009 .

[25]  J. Johnstone.  Supersizing the Mind , 2013 .

[26]  Tomoyuki Yamada,et al.  The Epistemic Closure Principle and the Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions , 2014 .

[27]  John Greco,et al.  A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I , 2010 .

[28]  J. Mcdowell,et al.  Mind and World , 1994 .

[29]  F. Adams,et al.  The bounds of cognition , 2001 .

[30]  E. Sosa.  A Virtue Epistemology , 2007 .

[31]  Alvin Plantinga.  Warrant and proper function , 1993 .

[32]  Matthias Steup,et al.  The Analysis of Knowledge , 2001 .

[33]  Joshua Knobe,et al.  Experimental philosophy. , 2012, Annual review of psychology.

[34]  D. Pritchard.  Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology , 2012 .

[35]  J. Adam Carter,et al.  Knowledge and the value of cognitive ability , 2013, Synthese.

[36]  Duncan Pritchard,et al.  Cognitive ability and the extended cognition thesis , 2010, Synthese.

[37]  Myron Louis Gochnauer,et al.  The Analysis of Knowledge , 1941, Nature.

[38]  J. Yolton.  A Theory of Knowledge , 1924, Nature.

[39]  Richard Menary.  Cognitive integration: mind and cognition unbounded , 2007 .

[40]  Jennifer Lackey.  What Luck is Not , 2008 .