Securing "Encryption + Proof of Knowledge" in the Random Oracle Model

To create encryption schemes that offer security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, this paper shows how to securely combine a simple encryption scheme with a proof of knowledge made noninteractive with a hash function. A typical example would be combining the ElGamal encryption scheme with the Schnorr signature scheme. While the straightforward combination will fail to provide security in the random oracle model, we present a class of encryption schemes that uses a proof of knowledge where the security can be proven based on the random oracle assumption and the number theoretic assumptions. The resulting schemes are useful as any casual party can be assured of the (in)validity of the ciphertexts.

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