Dynamic Formation of Preferential Trade Agreements: The Role of Flexibility

In practice, free trade agreements (FTAs) vastly outnumber customs unions (CUs). Nevertheless, the literature traditionally views CUs as optimal for members because CU members coordinate external tariffs. I show that a dynamic FTA flexibility benefit can help explain the prevalence of FTAs: individual FTA members have the flexibility to form their own future FTAs whereas CU members must jointly engage in future CU formation. I show how the relative prevalence of FTAs versus CUs depends on the structure of market size asymmetry across countries and use these predictions to shed some light on FTA versus CU formation in Europe and South America. Formation dynamique d’accords commerciaux preferentiels : le role de la flexibilite. En pratique, les accords de libre‐echange (ALE) sont plus nombreux que les unions douanieres (UD). Neanmoins, la litterature specialisee percoit traditionnellement que les UD sont optimales pour les membres parce qu’ils peuvent coordonner leurs tarifs externes. On montre qu’une flexibilite dynamique de l’ALE peut aider a expliquer la prevalence des ALE : les membres des ALE ont la flexibilite de former leurs propres ALE dans l’avenir alors que les membres des UD s’engagent conjointement pour la formation des UD futures. On montre comment la prevalence des ALE versus les UD depend de la structure de l’asymetrie de la taille entre les pays, et on utilise ces previsions pour eclairer les choix entre la formation de ALE et de UD en Europe et en Amerique du Sud.

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