Strategic and experimental analyses of conflict and terrorism

Understanding the root causes of conflict and terrorism ultimately will allow policymakers to enact measures to reduce violence’s associated costs. This special issue on “Strategic and Experimental Approaches to the Study of Conflict and Terrorism” consists of papers that analyze issues related to conflict or terrorism using the tools of applied game theory or experimental economics. This introductory article provides an overview of, and explains the relationships between, the studies included in the special issue.

[1]  Idean Salehyan.  The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations , 2010 .

[2]  Kai A. Konrad,et al.  Dynamic Contests and the Discouragement Effect , 2012 .

[3]  Dan Kovenock,et al.  The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets , 2018 .

[4]  Timothy Mathews,et al.  A model of a multilateral proxy war with spillovers , 2018, Public Choice.

[5]  S. Sanders,et al.  RAISING THE COST OF REBELLION: THE ROLE OF THIRD‐PARTY INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT , 2009 .

[6]  Changxia Ke,et al.  Brothers in Arms - An Experiment on the Alliance Puzzle , 2013, Games Econ. Behav..

[7]  K. Gleditsch,et al.  Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups , 2011, International Organization.

[8]  J. Neumann,et al.  Theory of games and economic behavior , 1945, 100 Years of Math Milestones.

[9]  James W. Boudreau,et al.  Stag hunt contests and alliance formation , 2018, Public Choice.

[10]  Ron Siegel,et al.  Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations , 2014, J. Econ. Theory.

[11]  Yang-Ming Chang,et al.  A game-theoretic analysis of international trade and political conflict over external territories , 2019 .

[12]  Zijun Luo,et al.  A model of terrorism and counterterrorism with location choices , 2019 .

[13]  War and peace: Third-party intervention in conflict , 2007 .

[14]  T. Schelling.  The Strategy of Conflict , 1963 .

[15]  Kai A. Konrad,et al.  The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints , 2008 .

[16]  Timothy Mathews,et al.  The Interdependence Between Homeland Security Efforts of a State and a Terrorist’s Choice of Attack * , 2012 .

[17]  Jack Hirshleifer,et al.  The analytics of continuing conflict , 1988, Synthese.

[18]  Larry Samuelson,et al.  Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation Against an Unknown Attacker , 2005 .

[19]  The role of noise in alliance formation and collusion in conflicts , 2017 .

[20]  Derek J. Clark,et al.  Asymmetric Conflict , 2007 .

[21]  Michael R. Baye,et al.  The all-pay auction with complete information , 1990 .

[22]  J. Hirshleifer.  Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success , 1989 .

[23]  S. Skaperdas,et al.  Guns, Butter, and Openness: On the Relationship between Security and Trade , 2001 .

[24]  Diego Aycinena,et al.  Valuation structure in incomplete information contests: experimental evidence , 2018, Public Choice.

[25]  Roman M. Sheremeta,et al.  The attack and defense of weakest-link networks , 2010, Public Choice.

[26]  Kofi O. Nti.  Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations , 1999 .

[27]  Timothy Mathews,et al.  Simple analytics of the impact of terror generation on attacker–defender interactions , 2019 .

[28]  Kai A. Konrad,et al.  Strategy and Dynamics in Contests , 2009 .

[29]  J. Hirshleifer.  From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods , 1983 .

[30]  J. Morgan,et al.  An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction , 1997 .

[31]  S. Polachek,et al.  Conflict and Trade , 1980 .