Using property rights theory to overcome success barriers to software development project: Protection of contractors' knowledge

A fundamental tenet of the information systems discipline holds that: (a) changing requirements in software development projects (SDP) are the main reason for failure; (b) therefore, in case of such uncertainties, fixed-price contracts (FPC) are not suitable for success. Our research, informed by economic theories, compellingly illustrates that among other things changing requirements stems from missing protection on knowledge. In this paper, we present an analysis of knowledge difficult to protect. Both parties must share knowledge during the specification of requirements. However, this business knowledge is an essential intellectual property, and thus needs protection for misuse. We enact a strategy to achieve SDPs success despite these barriers. Our theoretical and empirical analysis also found that SDP success is largely an uncertainty problem between the contractors on the management level, and thus technical-organizational approaches alone are inadequate for achieving success. Based on property rights theory, we introduce two models for protecting knowledge depending on uncertainties. Our findings offer managers important insights into how they can design and enact FPC for effectively manage SDPs. Further, we show how the economic theories can enhance understanding of SDP dynamics and advance the development of a theory of effective control of SDP success.

[1]  Patricia M. Norman Are your secrets safe? Knowledge protection in strategic alliances , 2001 .

[2]  Saleem Abuleil,et al.  A Taxonomy of an IT Project Failure: Root Causes , 2009 .

[3]  M. Benaroch,et al.  Contract Design Choices in IT Outsourcing: New Lessons from Software Development Outsourcing Contracts , 2012 .

[4]  W. Dugger The Economic Institutions of Capitalism , 1987 .

[5]  Edsger W. Dijkstra,et al.  The humble programmer , 1972, CACM.

[6]  Amrit Tiwana,et al.  Beyond the black box: knowledge overlaps in software outsourcing , 2004, IEEE Software.

[7]  Douglas Walton,et al.  Abductive Reasoning , 2017 .

[8]  Martin Glinz,et al.  On Non-Functional Requirements , 2007, 15th IEEE International Requirements Engineering Conference (RE 2007).

[9]  Pieter M. A. Ribbers,et al.  IT outsourcing contracts: practical implications of the incomplete contract theory , 2003, 36th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2003. Proceedings of the.

[10]  Marzena Swigon Personal knowledge and information management – conception and exemplification , 2013, J. Inf. Sci..

[11]  Jennifer E. Rowley,et al.  The wisdom hierarchy: representations of the DIKW hierarchy , 2007, J. Inf. Sci..

[12]  D. North Institutions and Credible Commitment , 1999 .

[13]  A. Clark,et al.  The Extended Mind , 1998, Analysis.

[14]  O. Williamson The economic institutions of capitalism , 1985 .

[15]  Ming Fan,et al.  Design and Analysis of Contracts for Software Outsourcing , 2010, Inf. Syst. Res..

[16]  D. Teece Strategies for Managing Knowledge Assets: the Role of Firm Structure and Industrial Context , 2000 .

[17]  M. Bogers The Open Innovation Paradox: Knowledge Sharing and Protection in R&D Collaborations , 2010 .

[18]  H. Mayer Interview und schriftliche Befragung: Grundlagen und Methoden empirischer Sozialforschung , 2013 .

[19]  Thorsten Semrau,et al.  What drives the allocation of specific investments between buyer and supplier , 2015 .

[20]  Yogesh Kumar Dwivedi,et al.  IS/IT Project Failures: A Review of the Extant Literature for Deriving a Taxonomy of Failure Factors , 2013, TDIT.

[21]  Christoph Kausch,et al.  Negative side effects of customer integration , 2010, Int. J. Technol. Manag..

[22]  M. Zeleny Management support systems: Towards integrated knowledge management , 1987 .

[23]  J. M. Singer,et al.  IEEE Recommended Practice for Software Requirements SpeciÞcations , 1993 .

[24]  Jochen Gläser,et al.  Experteninterviews und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse , 2010 .

[25]  Michael D. Myers,et al.  The qualitative interview in IS research: Examining the craft , 2007, Inf. Organ..

[26]  Gerhard Schurz,et al.  Patterns of abduction , 2008, Synthese.

[27]  Richard J. Varey The Knowing Organization: : How Organizations Use Information to Construct Meaning, Create Knowledge, and Make Decisions , 2013 .

[28]  O. Williamson Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange , 1983 .

[29]  Khaled El Emam,et al.  A Replicated Survey of IT Software Project Failures , 2008, IEEE Software.

[30]  Suzanne Rivard,et al.  A tale of two outsourcing contracts , 2003, Wirtschaftsinf..

[31]  Cecil Eng Huang Chua,et al.  Client strategies in vendor transition: A threat balancing perspective , 2012, J. Strateg. Inf. Syst..

[32]  P. Grossman,et al.  The Meaning of Property Rights: Law versus Economics? , 2002, Land Economics.

[33]  Y. Barzel Economic analysis of property rights , 1989 .

[34]  Anandhi Bharadwaj,et al.  An Empirical Analysis of Contract Structures in IT Outsourcing , 2009, Inf. Syst. Res..

[35]  Lior Fink,et al.  Why project size matters for contract choice in software development outsourcing , 2014, DATB.

[36]  Klaus Pohl,et al.  The Three Dimensions of Requirements Engineering , 1993, CAiSE.

[37]  Richard Craswell Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere , 2005 .

[38]  Kweku-Muata Osei-Bryson,et al.  Using decision tree modelling to support Peircian abduction in IS research: a systematic approach for generating and evaluating hypotheses for systematic theory development , 2011, Inf. Syst. J..

[39]  R. Ackoff From Data to Wisdom , 2014 .

[40]  Marzena źwigoń,et al.  Personal knowledge and information management - conception and exemplification , 2013 .

[41]  Joy Beatty,et al.  Software Requirements 3 , 2013 .

[42]  K. Valkokari,et al.  KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN CUSTOMER–SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS , 2010 .

[43]  Yossi Lichtenstein,et al.  Puzzles in software development contracting , 2004, CACM.

[44]  Georg von Krogh,et al.  How does social software change knowledge management? Toward a strategic research agenda , 2012, J. Strateg. Inf. Syst..

[45]  O. Hart,et al.  Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm , 1988, Journal of Political Economy.

[46]  J. Liebeskind,et al.  Knowledge, Strategy, and the Theory of the Firm , 1996 .

[47]  Ulrika Badenfelt Fixing the contract after the contract is fixed: a study of incomplete contracts in IT and construction projects , 2011 .

[48]  O. Williamson The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting , 1985 .