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Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem with a restricted domain

Abstract. In this paper we extend Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem by showing that the large domain of social lotteries can be significantly restricted – it is sufficient that the domain consists only of constant extended lotteries.

Zvi Safra | Einat Weissengrin | Zvi Safra | Einat Weissengrin

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