Minx: a simple and efficient anonymous packet format

<i>Minx</i> is a cryptographic message format for encoding anonymous messages, relayed through a network of Chaumian mixes. It provides security against a passive adversary by completely hiding correspondences between input and output messages. Possibly corrupt mixes on the message path gain no information about the route length or the position of the mix on the route. Most importantly Minx resists active attackers that are prepared to modify messages in order to embed tags which they will try to detect elsewhere in the network. The proposed scheme imposes a low communication and computational overhead, and only combines well understood cryptographic primitives.

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