PROBABILISTIC CONDITIONALS ARE ALMOST MONOTONIC

We examine some old and new paradoxes of probability, give a rough account of probabilistic conditionals, and prove some new results about non-monotonicity in probabilistic conditionals. It is well known that such conditionals are not monotonic ‐ a conditional which is true can become false when additional hypotheses are added. We show that nonetheless, the conditionals are usually monotonic, in both finite and countably infinite universes, or roughly speaking that we do not actually have to worry about non-monotonicity in practice.

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