Contractual distortions in a market with frictions

Abstract This paper analyses contract design in a decentralized market environment with frictions. While principals (e.g., firms) have all contractual power, their market power is constrained as agents (e.g., workers) can choose to wait and search for better offers. We find that results depend crucially on how market frictions affect agents’ utilities. With type-independent costs of search and waiting, equilibrium contracts are always first-best. If agents are impatient and discount future payoffs, however, distortions vanish only gradually. In the latter case, we also characterize equilibrium offers and show that the market exhibits two types of externalities, both of which are absent in the case of type-independent costs of search.

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