论文信息 - Epistemic Importance and the Logic of Theory Change

Epistemic Importance and the Logic of Theory Change

In an ideal world science would be, if not definitive, then at least cumulative. New laws and facts would be added constantly to well established theories and their consequences would be determined. However, as modern philosophy of science has so painstakingly shown us, science is full of revisions and setbacks.

P. Gärdenfors

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