论文信息 - Shapley-like values for interval bankruptcy games

Shapley-like values for interval bankruptcy games

In this paper interval bankruptcy games arising from bankruptcy situations with interval claims are introduced. For this class of cooperative games two (marginal-based) Shapley-like values are considered and the relation between them is studied.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

R. Branzei | Dinko Dimitrov | S. Tijs

[1] J. Harsanyi. A bargaining model for the cooperative n-person game , 1958 .

[2] G. Owen. Multilinear Extensions of Games , 1972 .

[3] Ramon E. Moore. Methods and applications of interval analysis , 1979, SIAM studies in applied mathematics.

[4] Barry O'Neill,et al. A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud , 1982, Math. Soc. Sci..

[5] R. Aumann,et al. Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud , 1985 .

[6] Stef Tijs,et al. Bankruptcy games , 1987, Z. Oper. Research.

[7] L. Shapley. A Value for n-person Games , 1988 .

[8] Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano,et al. Game Theory Techniques for University Management: An Extended Bankruptcy Model , 2002, Ann. Oper. Res..

[9] Rodica Branzei,et al. How To Cope With Division Problems Under Interval Uncertainty Of Claims? , 2004, Int. J. Uncertain. Fuzziness Knowl. Based Syst..

[10] Judith Timmer,et al. On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs , 2004, Int. J. Game Theory.