LIDA and a Theory of Mind

Every agent aspiring to human level intelligence, every AGI agent, must be capable of a theory of mind. That is, it must be able to attribute mental states, including intentions, to other agents, and must use such attributions in its action selection process. The LIDA conceptual and computational model of cognition offers an explanation of how theory of mind is accomplished in humans and some other animals, and suggests how this explanation could be implemented computationally. Here we describe how the LIDA version of theory of mind is accomplished, and illustrate it with an example taken from an experiment with monkeys, chosen for simplicity.

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