The importance of exploration in online marketplaces

Nearly all online marketplaces face the challenge of ensuring the quality of sellers; this is particularly challenging in large marketplaces, where it may be infeasible to pre-screen all sellers. A growing trend in such settings is to use feedback from past transactions to infer the quality of new sellers. However, this process requires that existing buyers-the most valuable users of the platform-be subjected to matching to new, untrusted sellers, potentially leading to a bad experience. We investigate this tradeoff in a setting where existing buyers help uncover seller quality. We develop a stylized model, which captures the salient features inherent in such markets, while retaining analytical tractability. Our model uncovers a qualitative difference between exploration and exploitation, based on underlying network externalities between buyers and sellers in the market. In particular, in many settings, pure exploration achieves the optimal rate of successful matches.

[1]  Patrick Hummel,et al.  Machine learning in an auction environment , 2014, J. Mach. Learn. Res..

[2]  Laurens G. Debo,et al.  Signaling Quality Via Queues , 2010, Manag. Sci..

[3]  Dale T. Mortensen,et al.  Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment , 1993 .

[4]  Zhengyuan Zhou,et al.  The Importance of Exploration in Online Marketplaces , 2016, IEEE Internet Comput..

[5]  A. Banerjee,et al.  A Simple Model of Herd Behavior , 1992 .

[6]  Yishay Mansour,et al.  Implementing the “Wisdom of the Crowd” , 2013, Journal of Political Economy.

[7]  Z. Griliches Hybrid Corn and the Economics of Innovation. , 1960, Science.

[8]  J. Rochet,et al.  Platform competition in two sided markets , 2003 .

[9]  B. Caillaud,et al.  Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermediation Service Providers , 2003 .

[10]  S. Bikhchandani,et al.  You have printed the following article : A Theory of Fads , Fashion , Custom , and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades , 2007 .

[11]  Peter A. Diamond,et al.  Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium , 1982, Journal of Political Economy.

[12]  M. Armstrong Competition in Two-Sided Markets ¤ , 2005 .

[13]  Daryl J. Daley,et al.  Epidemic Modelling: An Introduction , 1999 .

[14]  J. Gittins Bandit processes and dynamic allocation indices , 1979 .

[15]  T. L. Lai Andherbertrobbins Asymptotically Efficient Adaptive Allocation Rules , 2022 .

[16]  Alisha C. Holland,et al.  A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms , 2009 .

[17]  Lones Smith,et al.  Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning , 2000 .

[18]  Frank M. Bass,et al.  A New Product Growth for Model Consumer Durables , 2004, Manag. Sci..