论文信息 - Game dynamics in mendelian populations

Game dynamics in mendelian populations

A game theoretical model for the evolution of strategies in animal conflicts is considered, using methods from dynamical systems and population genetics. It is shown that the Hardy-Weinbergequilibrium is readily approached. The differential equation for the gene frequencies is more complicated than that which has been studied previously in the corresponding asexual case.

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