Warning Time: Optimizing Strategic Signaling for Security Against Boundedly Rational Adversaries

Defender-attacker Stackelberg security games (SSGs) have been applied for solving many real-world security problems. Recent work in SSGs has incorporated a deceptive signaling scheme into the SSG model, where the defender strategically reveals information about her defensive strategy to the attacker, in order to influence the attacker's decision making for the defender's own benefit. In this work, we study the problem of signaling in security games against a boundedly rational attacker.

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