A Survey on the Cyber Attacks Against Non-linear State Estimation in Smart Grids

It is well-known that critical infrastructures would be targets for cyber attacks. In this paper, we focus on smart grids. In a smart grid system, information from smart meters would be used to perform a state estimation in real time in order to maintain the stability of the system. A wrong estimation can lead to diastrous consequences e.g. suspension of electricity supply or a big financial loss. Unfortunately, quite a number of recent results showed that attacks on this estimation process are feasible by manipulating readings of only a few meters. In this paper, we focus on nonlinear state estimation which is a more realistic model and widely employed in a real smart grid environment. We summarize and categorize all possible attacks, and review the mechanisms behind. We also briefly talk about the countermeasures. We hope that the community would be able to come up with a better protection scheme for smart grids.

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