Conditional dominance in games with unawareness

Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2011a) introduced generalized extensive-form games that allow for mutual unawareness. Here, we define the normal form of a generalized extensive-form game. The generalized normal-form game associated to a generalized extensive-form game may now consist of a collection of normal-form games. We use it to characterize extensive-form rationalizability (resp. prudent rationalizability) in generalized extensive-form games by iterative conditional strict (resp. weak) dominance in the associated generalized normal-form. We also show that the analogue to iterated admissibility for generalized normal-form games is not independent of extensive-form structure. This is because a player’s information set not only determines which nodes he considers possible but also of which game tree(s) he is aware of.

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