The architecture of democracy : constitutional design, conflict management, and democracy

PART I: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES: AN OVERVIEW Introduction Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy in Divided Societies 1. 1. Constitutional Design and the Problem of adoption: Proposals versus Processes 2. The Wave of Power Sharing Democracy 3. Institutions and Coalition-Building in Post-Communist Transitions PART II: PRESIDENTIALISM, FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION, AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS. 4. Presidents, Parliaments and Democracy: Insights from the Post-Communist World 5. Presidentialism and Democratic Performance 6. Constitutional asymmetries: Communal Representation, Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy 7. Federalism and State-Building: Post-Communist and Post-Colonial Perspectives 8. Ballots not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems and Democratization 9. Designing Electoral Rules and Waiting for an Electoral System to Evolve PART III: COUNTRY STUDIES 10. 10. Constitutional Engineering in Fiji 11. The British-Irish Agreement of 1998: Results and Prospects 12. The Eritrean Experience in Constitution Making: The Dialectic of Process and Substance 13. Indonesia's Democratic Transition: Playing By the Rules 14. Institutional Design, Ethnic Conflict Management, and Democracy in Nigeria 15. India