Will There Be Any Neat Solutions to Small Problems in Cognitive Science?

The question is prompted by Eugene Charniak's (1978) recent editorial introducing the new 'Theoretical Notes' section. The idea of such a section is excellent, but I am dubious about one aspect of it. Charniak writes that one of its functions will indeed be to present neat solutions to small problems. He illustrates the idea with R. McGuire's observation of the difference in the acceptability of the following sentences as ways of describing the normal mode of entering vehicles: Fred got on the train. *Fred got in the train. Fred got in the car. *Fred got on the car. The difference, according to McGuire, reflects the fact that one only uses 'get on' when one can stand up in the thing, 'get in' when one can't. This solution is neat, but wrong. The problems arise if one considers other cases. For example, the sentence: Fred got on the stool