Firms' Motivations for Environmental Overcompliance

This article examines firms motivations for environmental overcompliance. A theoretical model is developed to identify the internal and external factors that influence firms decisions for environmental overcompliance. An empirical analysis is then conducted to determine the statistical significance of those factors using the primary data collected in an industrial survey in Oregon. The results suggest that diverse factors influence business decisions for environmental overcompliance, including market forces, regulatory pressures, and personal values and beliefs of upper management toward environmental stewardship.

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