Overt visual attention and value computation in complex risky choice

Traditional models of decision making under uncertainty explain human behavior in simple situations with a minimal set of alternatives and attributes. Some of them, such as prospect theory, have been proven successful and robust in such simple situations. Yet, less is known about the preference formation during decision making in more complex cases. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that attention plays a role in the decision process but most theories make simplifying assumptions about where attention is deployed. In this study, we replace these assumptions by measuring where humans deploy overt attention, i.e. where they fixate. To assess the influence of task complexity, participants perform two tasks. The simpler of the two requires participants to choose between two alternatives with two attributes each (four items to consider). The more complex one requires a choice between four alternatives with four attributes each (16 items to consider). We then compare a large set of model classes, of different levels of complexity, by considering the dynamic interactions between uncertainty, attention and pairwise comparisons between attribute values. The task of all models is to predict what choices humans make, using the sequence of observed eye movements for each participant as input to the model. We find that two models outperform all others. The first is the two-layer leaky accumulator which predicts human choices on the simpler task better than any other model. We call the second model, which is introduced in this study, TNPRO. It is modified from a previous model from management science and designed to deal with highly complex decision problems. Our results show that this model performs well in the simpler of our two tasks (second best, after the accumulator model) and best for the complex task. Our results suggest that, when faced with complex choice problems, people prefer to accumulate preference based on attention-guided pairwise comparisons.

[1]  R. Hertwig,et al.  The priority heuristic: making choices without trade-offs. , 2006, Psychological review.

[2]  A. Tversky,et al.  Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty , 1992 .

[3]  Bernard Roy,et al.  Classement et choix en présence de points de vue multiples , 1968 .

[4]  A. Tversky,et al.  Context-dependent preferences , 1993 .

[5]  Joseph G. Johnson,et al.  Decision making under risk and uncertainty. , 2010, Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive science.

[6]  N. Chater,et al.  Preference reversal in multiattribute choice. , 2010, Psychological review.

[7]  D. Noton,et al.  Eye movements and visual perception. , 1971, Scientific American.

[8]  J. Edward Russo,et al.  Eye Fixations Can Save the World: a Critical Evaluation and a Comparison Between Eye Fixations and Other Information Processing Methodologies , 1978 .

[9]  Nick Chater,et al.  Salience driven value integration explains decision biases and preference reversal , 2012, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[10]  Jean Pierre Brans,et al.  HOW TO SELECT AND HOW TO RANK PROJECTS: THE PROMETHEE METHOD , 1986 .

[11]  Christof Koch,et al.  Control of Selective Visual Attention: Modeling the Where Pathway , 1995, NIPS.

[12]  J. Gold,et al.  The neural basis of decision making. , 2007, Annual review of neuroscience.

[13]  D. H. Wedell,et al.  Distinguishing Among Models of Contextually Induced Preference Reversals , 1991 .

[14]  Robert A. Marino,et al.  Free viewing of dynamic stimuli by humans and monkeys. , 2009, Journal of vision.

[15]  B. Dosher,et al.  Strategies for multiattribute binary choice. , 1983, Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition.

[16]  Derrick J. Parkhurst,et al.  Modeling the role of salience in the allocation of overt visual attention , 2002, Vision Research.

[17]  Gordon D. A. Brown,et al.  Decision by sampling , 2006, Cognitive Psychology.

[18]  Andreas Glöckner,et al.  An eye‐tracking study on information processing in risky decisions: Evidence for compensatory strategies based on automatic processes , 2011 .

[19]  Neil Stewart,et al.  A decision-by-sampling account of decision under risk , 2008 .

[20]  James L. McClelland,et al.  Loss aversion and inhibition in dynamical models of multialternative choice. , 2004, Psychological review.

[21]  A. Tversky Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice. , 1972 .

[22]  Neil Stewart EPS Prize Lecture: Decision by sampling: The role of the decision environment in risky choice , 2009, Quarterly journal of experimental psychology.

[23]  M. Birnbaum,et al.  New Paradoxes of Risky Decision Making , 2022 .

[24]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect theory: analysis of decision under risk , 1979 .

[25]  Eric J. Johnson,et al.  The adaptive decision maker , 1993 .

[26]  J. Brans,et al.  A Preference Ranking Organisation Method: (The PROMETHEE Method for Multiple Criteria Decision-Making) , 2008 .

[27]  F. Hermens,et al.  Eye Movements in Risky Choice , 2015, Journal of behavioral decision making.

[28]  J. Townsend,et al.  Decision field theory: a dynamic-cognitive approach to decision making in an uncertain environment. , 1993, Psychological review.

[29]  Ernst Niebur,et al.  Risk-taking bias in human decision-making is encoded via a right–left brain push–pull system , 2019, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[30]  Yuan Chang Leong,et al.  Dynamic Interaction between Reinforcement Learning and Attention in Multidimensional Environments , 2017, Neuron.

[31]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk — Source link , 2007 .

[32]  L. Stark,et al.  Scanpaths in Eye Movements during Pattern Perception , 1971, Science.

[33]  Ernst Niebur,et al.  Variable-Resolution Displays: A Theoretical, Practical, and Behavioral Evaluation , 2002, Hum. Factors.

[34]  Ali Borji,et al.  State-of-the-Art in Visual Attention Modeling , 2013, IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence.

[35]  H. Egeth,et al.  Attentive pointing in natural scenes correlates with other measures of attention , 2017, Vision Research.

[36]  J. Neumann,et al.  Theory of games and economic behavior, 2nd rev. ed. , 1947 .

[37]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect Theory : An Analysis of Decision under Risk Author ( s ) : , 2007 .

[38]  M. Rabin,et al.  The Gambler's and Hot-Hand Fallacies: Theory and Applications , 2007 .

[39]  Ian Krajbich,et al.  Visual fixations and the computation and comparison of value in simple choice , 2010, Nature Neuroscience.

[40]  Christopher M. Masciocchi,et al.  Everyone knows what is interesting: salient locations which should be fixated. , 2009, Journal of vision.

[41]  Roger Ratcliff,et al.  A Theory of Memory Retrieval. , 1978 .

[42]  P. Vincke,et al.  Note-A Preference Ranking Organisation Method: The PROMETHEE Method for Multiple Criteria Decision-Making , 1985 .

[43]  John W. Payne,et al.  The adaptive decision maker: Name index , 1993 .

[44]  R. Almond The therapeutic community. , 1971, Scientific American.

[45]  R. Ratcliff,et al.  Multialternative decision field theory: a dynamic connectionist model of decision making. , 2001, Psychological review.

[46]  Jerome R. Busemeyer,et al.  The effect of "irrelevant" variables on decision making: Criterion shifts in preferential choice? , 1992 .

[47]  James L. McClelland,et al.  The time course of perceptual choice: the leaky, competing accumulator model. , 2001, Psychological review.

[48]  Marius Usher,et al.  The formation of preference in risky choice , 2019, PLoS Comput. Biol..

[49]  Christof Koch,et al.  A Model of Saliency-Based Visual Attention for Rapid Scene Analysis , 2009 .

[50]  Cecilia R. Aragon,et al.  Optimization by Simulated Annealing: An Experimental Evaluation; Part I, Graph Partitioning , 1989, Oper. Res..

[51]  A. Tversky Intransitivity of preferences. , 1969 .

[52]  D. Bernoulli Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk , 1954 .

[53]  A. Copeland Review: John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of games and economic behavior , 1945 .