Operantly conditioning a negotiator's concession making

Abstract This study investigated the effects of a bargaining strategy that rewards the opponent's concessions. The first of four experiments revealed that a negotiator's utilization of this reward strategy resulted in large concessions by and quick agreement with the opponent. The second experiment demonstrated that the large concessions continue after the rewards cease and the third, that two previously rewarded negotiatiors subsequently make large concessions to each other and reach quick agreements. Finally, the fourth experiment added strength to a reinforcement explanation of the results by eliminating an interpretation based upon a reciprocity effect.

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