Settling It on the Field

Using a sample of battlefield data from twentieth-century wars, the author of this article tests a number of previously untested hypotheses linking battle events and the decision to end violent conflict. The author explores how factors like the distribution of power, battlefield casualties, and information that flows from the battlefield influence war termination. The analysis speaks to the validity of competing rational choice theories of war termination.

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