Competition Effects of Supermarket Services

This article investigates the competition effects of supermarket services using fluid milk as a case study. A simultaneous equation model for services and price competition is estimated with scanner data from fifteen supermarket chains using two alternative measures of services, namely store size and principal components of in-store services. Empirical results show that increasing services results in economies of scope, greater supermarket chain-level demand, lower price elasticity of demand, and enhanced market power, leading to higher milk prices and quantity sold. We conclude that, as result of service competition, supermarkets differentiate themselves from competitors and successfully attract less price-sensitive consumers. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.

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