Collective Choice Lotteries

Randomization is playing an ever increasing role in economic design with examples ranging from fair allocation to matching markets to voting. I propose and briefly discuss three interdisciplinary and interrelated research questions that deserve further attention: (i) when are collective choice lotteries acceptable, (ii) how do agents compare lotteries, and (iii) how can randomized rules be implemented.

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