Verifiable Elections That Scale for Free

In order to guarantee a fair and transparent voting process, electronic voting schemes must be verifiable. Most of the time, however, it is important that elections also be anonymous. The notion of a verifiable shuffle describes how to satisfy both properties at the same time: ballots are submitted to a public bulletin board in encrypted form, verifiably shuffled by several mix servers (thus guaranteeing anonymity), and then verifiably decrypted by an appropriate threshold decryption mechanism. To guarantee transparency, the intermediate shuffles and decryption results, together with proofs of their correctness, are posted on the bulletin board throughout this process.

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