Issues in Securing Critical Infrastructure Networks for Smart Grid Based on SCADA, Other Industrial Control and Communication Systems

Computer facilities and microprocessor-based technology have been successfully used in the energy industry. For protection and equipment control, this technology has been used in SCADA, remote control and monitoring applications. Particular attention is paid to the cyber security sector for automation and control systems. Protective application of the equipment and control, SCADA, monitoring and remote control, uses the technology with microprocessor. Due to the great importance of the power supply process, there is no question of being left in a state of vulnerability and neglect. Security is not perfect and will never be. For this reason, there will always be security breaches and incidents. Also, for this reason, not only protection mechanisms are in place, but also mechanisms for rapid detection of incidents and which are able to react effectively to the isolation of problems and to ensuring security. Processes security for systems will continue to evolve in the future. By definition, there are no communication systems that are 100% safe. Attacks against critical industrial infrastructures marked an increase not only in terms of number but also of the level of complexity. The destruction of the industrial control system (ICS) and critical processes were interrupted. For many organizations, the security improvement in ICS systems is great. The extreme sensitivity to ensure the availability and performance of industrial processes has led to a more conservative and rigorous approach to how security measures are implemented. Cyber-attacks that could compromise the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of ICS systems may come from within systems or from outside ICS systems. Among the ICS system infection vectors from the perspective of the SANS Institute (2014) include: external threats (state attacks, hacking etc.), malware, exploiting tools, phishing, internal attacks, cyber security protocols, and industrial espionage. This chapter addresses the cyber security issues required for the protection, automation, control and communications systems of transformation stations as well as methods that could be used to prevent computer attacks that can have a significant impact on the availability of the system Electro-energetic effect with serious consequences on extended area interruptions.

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