Environmental Performance Rating and Disclosure: China's Green-Watch Program

In this paper we describe a new incentive-based pollution control program in China, in which the environmental performance of firms is rated from best to worst using five colors--green, blue, yellow, red and black--and the ratings are disseminated to the public through the media. We focus on the first two municipal disclosure programs, which have been implemented at very different levels of economic and institutional development. In both cases, the increases in compliance with pollution regulations have been similar to increases produced by public disclosure programs in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The results suggest that incentives created by public disclosure may significantly reduce pollution in China, even though environmental NGO's play little role and there is no formal channel for public participation in environmental regulation.

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