Sequential Elections with Limited Information A Formal Analysis
暂无分享,去创建一个
We develop an incomplete information model of a sequence of elections in a one-dimensional policy space, where voters have no con temporaneous information about candidate positions, and candidates have no information about voter preferences. The only source of information is contemporaneous endorsement data and historical data on the policy positions of previous winning candidates. We define a notion of "stationary rational expectations equilibrium", and show that such an equilibrium results in outcomes which are equivalent to those that would occur under full infor mation.
[1] R. McKelvey,et al. Elections with limited information: A multidimensional model , 1987 .
[2] Peter C. Ordeshook,et al. Sequential elections with limited information , 1985 .
[3] R. McKelvey,et al. Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information , 1986 .
[4] Peter C. Ordeshook,et al. Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources , 1985 .