Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction

We analyze a group political lobbying all-pay auction with a group specific public good prize, in which one group follows a weakest-link and the other group follows a best-shot impact function. We completely characterize all semi-symmetric equilibria. There are two types of equilibria: (1) each player in the best-shot group puts mass at the upper bound of the support, whereas each player in the other group puts mass at the lower bound of the support; (2) players in the best-shot group put masses at both the lower and the upper bounds, while the other group randomizes without a mass point.

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