The Economic Theory of Alliances
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] U.S. Assistance, Israeli Allocation, and the Arms Race in the Middle East , 1982 .
[2] Glenn Palmer. Corralling the Free Rider: Deterrence and the Western Alliance , 1990 .
[3] Ronald Smith,et al. The Demand for Military Expenditure , 1980 .
[4] A Method for Identifying the Public Good Allocation Process Within a Group , 1985 .
[5] John A. C. Conybeare. A Portfolio Diversification Model of Alliances , 1992 .
[6] R. Zeckhauser,et al. An economic theory of alliances , 1966 .
[7] J. Hirshleifer. From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods , 1983 .
[8] J. O'neal. Budgetary savings from conscription and burden sharing in NATO , 1992 .
[9] J. Murdoch,et al. Nash-Cournot or Lindahl Behavior?: An Empirical Test for the NATO Allies , 1990 .
[10] J. O'neal. Testing the Theory of Collective Action , 1990 .
[11] T. Sandler,et al. The Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance 1880–1914: A Collective Goods Approach , 1990, American Political Science Review.
[12] Todd Sandler,et al. EASY RIDERS, JOINT PRODUCTION, AND PUBLIC GOODS* , 1984 .
[13] T. Sandler,et al. BURDEN SHARING, STRATEGY, AND THE DESIGN OF NATO , 1980 .
[14] Inefficiency in international defence alliances and the economics of Bureaucracy , 1992 .
[15] H. Varian,et al. On the private provision of public goods , 1986 .
[16] M. McGuire. Mixed public‐private benefit and public‐good supply with application to the NATO alliance , 1990 .
[17] East European military expenditures in the 1970s: collective good or bargaining offer? , 1983 .
[18] Martin C. McGuire,et al. Group size, group homo-geneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under cournot behavior , 1974 .
[19] P. Diehl,et al. The Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests , 1994 .
[20] Todd Sandler,et al. On the Economic Theory of Alliances , 1975 .
[21] Todd Sandler,et al. Complementarity, free riding, and the military expenditures of NATO allies , 1984 .
[22] Neil Bruce,et al. Defence Expenditures by Countries in Allied and Adversarial Relationships , 1990 .
[23] J. Andreoni. Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence , 1989, Journal of Political Economy.
[24] Todd Sandler,et al. IMPURITY OF DEFENSE: AN APPLICATION TO THE ECONOMICS OF ALLIANCES , 1977 .
[25] J. Murdoch,et al. Alternative Collective-Goods Models of Military Alliances: Theory and Empirics , 1994 .
[26] Ronald Smith. Models of military expenditure , 1989 .
[27] Todd Sandler,et al. Collective Action: Theory and Applications , 1992 .
[28] Wallace J. Thies. Alliances and Collective Goods , 1987 .
[29] C. Montmarquette,et al. The demand for military expenditures: An international comparison , 1981 .
[30] J. Andreoni. IMPURE ALTRUISM AND DONATIONS TO PUBLIC GOODS: A THEORY OF WARM-GLOW GIVING* , 1990 .
[31] J. O'neal,et al. NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change , 1989 .
[32] Todd Sandler,et al. A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of NATO , 1982 .
[33] J. Murdoch,et al. On distinguishing the behavior of nuclear and non‐nuclear allies in NATO , 1990 .
[34] B. Hilton,et al. The McGuire model and the economics of the NATO alliance , 1991 .
[35] Kar-yiu Wong. Foreign trade, military alliance, and defence‐burden sharing , 1991 .
[36] T. Sandler,et al. The Private Provision of Public Goods: a Perspective on Neutrality , 1991 .
[37] R. Cornes,et al. The theory of externalities, public goods and club goods. 2nd. ed. , 1996 .
[38] J. Murdoch,et al. The Political Economy of Scandinavian Neutrality , 1986 .
[39] S. Mehay,et al. Publicness, Scale, and Spillover Effects in Defense Spending , 1990 .
[40] Mark A. Boyer. A simple and untraditional analysis of western alliance burden‐sharing , 1990 .
[41] J. Murdoch,et al. An Econometric Technique for Comparing Median Voter and Oligarchy Choice Models of Collective Action: The Case of the NATO Alliance , 1991 .
[42] S. Mehay,et al. Burden sharing in the NATO alliance: An empirical test of alternative views , 1991 .
[43] A Collective Goods Analysis of the Warsaw Pact after Czechoslovakia , 1974 .
[44] Glenn Palmer. Deterrence, defense spending, and elasticity: Alliance contributions to the public good , 1991 .
[45] Jacques van Ypersele de Strihou. Sharing the Defense Burden Among Western Allies , 1967 .
[46] J. Murdoch,et al. AUSTRALIAN DEMAND FOR MILITARY EXPENDITURES: 1961 ‐ 1979* , 1985 .
[47] Peter Warr,et al. The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income , 1983 .
[48] M. Olson,et al. The Logic of Collective Action , 1965 .
[49] B. Russett,et al. Collective Goods and International Organization , 1971, International Organization.
[50] Mark A. Boyer. Trading Public Goods in the Western Alliance System , 1989 .
[51] M. Okamura. Estimating the Impact of the Soviet Union's Threat on the United States-Japan Alliance: A Demand System Approach , 1991 .
[52] John R. Oneal,et al. The theory of collective action and burden sharing in NATO , 1990, International Organization.
[53] Shlomo Weber,et al. Economic Models of NATO , 1991 .
[54] Philip Jones. Defense Alliances and International Trade , 1988 .
[55] Glenn Palmer. Alliance Politics and Issue Areas: Determinants of Defense Spending , 1990 .
[56] J. Murdoch,et al. NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change: Further Observations , 1991 .