论文信息 - The Newsvendor Game Has a Nonempty Core

The Newsvendor Game Has a Nonempty Core

We settle an open conjecture regarding the newsvendor game. We prove that its core is always non-empty, for all possible joint distributions of the random demands. We give sufficient conditions under which the core is a singleton or it contains non-negative elements.

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