论文信息 - The bargaining problem: axioms concerning changes in the conflict point

The bargaining problem: axioms concerning changes in the conflict point

Abstract Two axioms concerning changes in the conflict point are introduced. A sufficient condition for a solution function to satisfy these axioms is that it satisfies the relatively weak adding requirement of Thomson-Myerson (1980).

Zvi Livne

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