论文信息 - COMPETITION IN AIRLINE NETWORKS: THE CASE OF CONSTANT ELASTICITY DEMANDS

COMPETITION IN AIRLINE NETWORKS: THE CASE OF CONSTANT ELASTICITY DEMANDS

Abstract This paper is concerned with the effect of competition in airline hub-and-spoke networks. Using constant elasticity demand functions, we demonstrate that competition in a single market may generate positive or negative network externalities, depending on price elasticities of demand.

Anming Zhang | Xin Wei

[1] A. Kanafani,et al. AIRLINE HUBBING : SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRPORT ECONOMICS , 1985 .

[2] Jan K. Brueckner,et al. FARE DETERMINATION IN AIRLINE HUB-AND-SPOKE NETWORKS , 1990 .

[3] A. Zhang,et al. Market Conduct in the Airline Industry: An Empirical Investigation , 1990 .

[4] Michael E. Levine,et al. AIRLINE COMPETITION IN DEREGULATED MARKETS: THEORY, FIRM STRATEGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY , 1987 .

[5] G. Werden,et al. The effects of mergers on price and output: Two case studies from the airline industry , 1991 .

[6] J. Brueckner,et al. Competition and mergers in airline networks , 1991 .

[7] Severin Borenstein,et al. Airline Mergers, Airport Dominance, and Market Power , 1990 .

[8] Jesús Seade,et al. On the effects of entry , 1980 .