Protecting critical buses in power-grid against data attacks: Adaptive protection schemes for smart cities

Accurate estimation of complex voltage phase angles at buses in the power-grid is crucial for determining the operational state of the power system. Existing methods for protection of the state estimate of critical buses against data injection attacks focus on design time assuming a static set of critical buses. We formulate a set of optimal protection schemes to enable operational time protection, where the set of critical buses that needs to be protected changes over time. Protection schemes are optimized against two dimensions: 1) cost of allocating the resources to secure measurements 2) cost of resource relocation. Given the intractable computation time complexity of optimal protection schemes, heuristic algorithms with reduced computation time complexity are presented. Using simulations on transmission network datasets, we show that our heuristic algorithms yield good approximate results with low latency while being able to scale for large power transmission networks.

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