Large Repeated Games with Uncertain Fundamentals I: Compressed Equilibrium

Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent, and (3) assume that the number of players is known. The current paper develops a general theory of repeated large Bayesian games that avoids some of these difficulties. To make the analysis more robust, it develops a concept of compressed equilibrium which is applicable to a general class of large Bayesian repeated anonymous games. JEL Codes: C71 Cooperative Games, C72 Noncooperative Games, and C78 Bargaining Theory

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