L’économie des organisations : mythes et réalités

The analysis of organizational change and particularly of its impacts on incentives is neither simple nor easy. We consider here four contexts (choosing a level of decentralization, choosing the level of responsibility for pollution damage, choosing a level of technological or organisational flexibility, chhosing an optimal level of inertia) to better understand the dangers of neglecting those impacts and illustrate the sometimes surprising results we may obtain from a rigorous and formal analysis of organizational contexts or situations broadly understood. L'analyse des impacts de changements organisationnels sur les incitations n'est ni simple ni facile. Nous considerons dans cet article l'analyse de ces impacts dans quatre contextes particuliers (le choix d'un niveau de decentralisation, le choix des regles de responsabilite dans le cadre du principe de pollueur-payeur, le choix d'un niveau de flexibilite technologique et organisationnelle, le choix d'un niveau optimal d'inertie dans une organisation) afin de mieux comprendre les dangers de negliger ces impacts et les resultats parfois surprenants que l'on peut obtenir suite a une analyse rigoureuse et formelle de situations et contextes organisationnels entendus au sens large.

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